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The global economic crisis and the Keynesian response to it have 
been widely interpreted as signaling the renewed importance of state 
intervention in the economy. However, stronger state intervention 
in industry, in contrast to finance, is unlikely to be implemented by 
the current political and administrative elite in developed countries, 
whose faith in the unfettered market mechanism and support for ‘free’ 
enterprise remain undaunted. 
More perplexing, however, is the continued absence of interventionist 
industrial policies in most of the developing world, where neo-
liberalism’s ability to foster development is broadly discredited and the 
role of an interventionist state in promoting industrialisation is more 
widely appreciated. 
This Development Viewpoint maintains that, despite neo-liberalism’s 
recent ‘crisis of legitimacy’, one major reason that industrial policies 
have not been more widely applied in developing countries has been 
the inhibiting effect of the most influential body of recent scholarship 
on state-led development, namely, that of the Developmental State 
Paradigm (DSP), which has focused its research on East Asia’s experience 
of late industrialisation. 
The Developmental State Paradigm
DSP literature is derived from seminal works by Alice Amsden (1989) 
and Robert Wade (1990) on South Korean and Taiwanese development, 
respectively. However, the concept of a ‘developmental state’ is only 
subsequently developed theoretically by scholars such as Evans (1995) 
and Woo-Cummings (1999). 
The DSP regards the specific authoritarian features of East Asian 
governments as having had a determinant role in promoting rapid 
development. This literature assumes that in a different political context, 
such as a democracy, vested interests are much more likely to be able 
to effectively resist or subvert the kind of developmental policies that 
drove East Asian late industrialisation. 
Thus, the implication is that effective state-led interventions and 
democracy are often incompatible. The DSP often couches this 
discussion in terms of the need for what it calls ‘state autonomy’, 
namely, the state’s independence from, and rejection of, special political 
and economic interests.
Despite these claims, effective state interventions have occurred within 
democratic contexts, most significantly in the Indian software industry 
but also in numerous other sectors across Latin America, South East Asia 
and the developed world. These cases provide support for maintaining 
the viability of both democratic and effective state-led development. 
The DSP literature has attempted, however, to identify in these cases 
certain socio-political conditions that it claims amount to ‘state 
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autonomy’ and has argued that such conditions have been the decisive 
factors. Inadvertently, such claims have tended to reinforce, rather than 
counter, the justification for curtailing popular control over economic 
policy. In addition, the fixation on such socio-political conditions has 
partially obscured the practical insights and lessons that could be 
derived from concretely investigating the actual dynamics of successful 
state interventions.
Recent research undertaken outside the Developmental State Paradigm 
has illustrated that successful state interventions derive not from 
idealized state autonomy but from the practical implementation of 
policies on the basis of taking a society’s complex of special interests 
into account and maneuvering among them, instead of remaining 
independent of them, in order to achieve developmental objectives. 
Such findings are best illustrated by the emerging literature on the 
success of the Indian software industry. This case is the focus of the rest 
of this Development Viewpoint.
The Indian Software Industry
The Indian software industry is widely recognised as an economic 
success, generating revenues of over $50 billion in 2008 and projected 
to approach $60 billion in 2009 (see Figure). Its revenues are expected 
to reach $100 billion within the next five years. Despite having been 
portrayed as a product of Indian economic liberalisation, most serious 
observers now accept that the Indian state has played a major role in its 
nurture and growth over the past three decades. 
Source: National [Indian] Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) 
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Though the DSP has tried to point to this sector’s success as an example 
of state autonomy, this interpretation is plagued by some glaring 
problems. The first is trying to reconcile India’s thriving democracy with 
the supposed requirements of state autonomy, namely, independence 
from vested economic and political interests. 
The DSP has tried to resolve this particular problem by claiming that the 
Department of Electronics (DoE), which is responsible for implementing 
IT policy, has been an autonomous agent within the Indian polity that 
has been able to draw up policies independently of special interests. 
However, this interpretation runs counter to a large body of concrete 
evidence. 
The second predicament for the DSP is why the DoE, if autonomous 
and developmental, continued to implement hardware policies until 
the mid-1990s that ran counter not only to the interests of the software 
industry but also to computerization of the country as a whole. Such 
policies represented the successful imposition of local computer 
manufacturers’ interests on the policies of DoE. 
Furthermore, the DSP fixation on trying to document autonomy 
has led researchers to pay less attention to the empirical realities of 
policymaking and, therefore, the concrete lessons that this experience 
could actually offer. Recent analysis of the software industry’s 
development, which has been undertaken outside of the DSP literature, 
illustrates three key features of the state’s success in promoting the 
development of the software industry (Saraswati 2008).   
First, there was a long-standing vision within the DoE and more 
broadly among the scientific elite in India regarding the developmental 
potential of software exports. This vision was first articulated in a 
government paper in 1968, and was followed by the implementation of 
a software export policy in 1972 and then India’s first software exports 
in 1974. 
Second, DoE bureaucrats had an in-depth operational understanding 
of the international and national structure of the software industry 
and its underlying economic relations. Third, DoE bureaucrats were 
keenly aware of the political economy of the industry, in particular the 
political and economic interests that had to be taken into account in 
implementing government policy. 
 
Hence, DoE bureaucrats were able to initiate policies that not only 
represented a workable compromise among conflicting interests but 
also facilitated the developmental goal of promoting software exports. 
Two examples are particularly illustrative. 
First, although the DoE had reflected the interests of local hardware 
manufacturers by supporting high tariffs on computer imports, it also 
mitigated the potential damage to local software firms by allowing 
them to import computers duty-free—in return for achieving specified 
export targets. 
Second, when changes in international telecommunications technology 
in the 1980s presented the opportunity to boost software exports from 
India, the DoE successfully lobbied central government to invest in the 
expensive physical infrastructure required to exploit this
opportunity, long before software interests alone had acquired the 
political clout to do so.  
These examples illustrate that the DoE was neither purely responsive to 
vested interests nor completely independent of them. Rather, having to 
deal practically with the intricacies of India’s political economy honed 
the bureaucrats’ ability to flexibly take special interests into account in 
the course of achieving their strategic developmental objectives.  
Implementing Policy
The experience of the Indian software industry is not an anomaly. 
Emerging research on other successful cases, including studies such as 
Lee 2002 on earlier East Asian industrialisation (upon which the entire 
state-led paradigm has been originally based) raises serious questions 
about the degree of state autonomy that the DSP has attributed to 
them. 
Furthermore, despite their diversity of experience, many of the cases 
of successful state interventions share important characteristics: the 
bureaucrats that implemented policies had a clear strategic vision, a 
sophisticated understanding of the political economy of their industry 
or sector, and a pragmatic approach of maneuvering through and 
around special interests in order to achieve their policy objectives. 
These findings are significant in several respects. First, they render 
unnecessary the unobtainable precondition of full state autonomy. The 
Developmental State Paradigm has exaggerated both the state’s ability 
to completely extricate itself from vested interests in society and the 
practical necessity of doing so.
Second, the findings illustrate the urgent need for bureaucrats to 
acquire an in-depth understanding of the political economy of their 
industry, sector and economy. The deeper this understanding—in 
particular of the political and economic interests involved—the greater 
their ability to identify the feasible policy options that can promote their 
developmental objectives. 
In sum, while the research governed by the Developmental State 
Paradigm continues to  contribute valuable evidence that the state can 
be an effective motor of development, its promotion of the unnecessary 
requirement of  full-blown state autonomy has led, paradoxically, to 
its diminishing influence as a viable alternative to neo-liberalism, even 
during the latter’s ‘crisis of legitimacy’. 
The experience of the Indian software industry has illustrated that 
successful state interventions are usually based, not on an unrealizable 
state autonomy, but on the practical capabilities of state bureaucrats 
who can take full account of the political economy context for their 
policies and maneuver tactically within a complex of vested interests in 
order to reach their strategic developmental objectives. 
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